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13 March 1974

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director, Security

SUBJECT : Your 14 March Meeting with Generals Graham and [REDACTED]

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1. Yesterday I introduced [REDACTED] mentioned that he was going to introduce you and Jack Blake to Danny Graham tomorrow. At that meeting [REDACTED] said that he will raise DCID 1/11, the Security Committee's new charter. As you know it has gone to the Management Committee for resolution of Ed Proctor's contention that the Security Committee is ill equipped to handle such things as sanitization, downgrading and declassification of compartmented matters - activities that are now the purview of the SIGINT Committee and the Committee for Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).

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2. [REDACTED] said that Graham feels strongly that a Security Committee should have security authorities and will push not only to overcome Proctor's objection but will go further and try to get some real teeth into the charter. I don't think he will be looking to you for supportive material. But if you are, you might mention that a close reading of the proposed DCID 1/11 on this issue clearly stipulates that the functions of the Security Committee vis-a-vis compartmentation are in terms of "technical" security guidance for establishment, maintenance and improvement of coordinated compartmented systems (Page 1 of attachment 3 to DCID 1/11) and "to formulate, coordinate, maintain and promulgate technical guidance for use in the administration of compartmented controls . . . concerning - sanitization, downgrading, declassification and decontrol responsibilities" (Page 2 Paragraph B and B (5) of attachment 3 to DCID 1/11). There is no intent of telling SIGINT and COMIREX what to sanitize, downgrade or declassify--we were going to tell them only how to do it.

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3. In connection with another matter that might come up at the meeting. You should be aware that the staffing pattern for the new Security Committee, according to

25X1A [] will consist of 1 full time chairman and two supporting staff officers, one each from CIA and DIA and a girl. These slots will come from the [] slots approved for the DCI's IC Staff. There has been no decision on personnel selection for these positions; but people are jockeying.

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25X1A [] said that he will not be the chairman because his other duties under [] will include overview of all USIB committee actions as they imping on the community.

25X1A [] name has come up as someone who has been considered. So did Marv's but I heard he wasn't interested.

25X1A [] has said that he was interested and intended to speak to [] on the Coordination Staff, IC. I've put my name in with [] but he told me that my background and career progress didn't make it plausible for being selected as chairman although there was a strong chance for selection as the CIA rep on The Staff. My point here is that, with the tight slot picture, the OS should make a strong pitch to get both slots, the chairman and the CIA representative, on The Staff. To date we haven't made any noise in this direction at all. Your meeting might provide the opportunity for an initial sounding out of Danny Graham on this point. Further, there will be three permanent subcommittees to be chaired, one on audio countermeasures, one on computer security and one on compartmentation. Again according to

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25X1A [] the candidates for these positions have not been considered nor has it been decided whether these will be full time or double duty assignments. [] mentioned only that a great deal of work would be expected from the chairman and it might be up to the agency tasked to take a slot out of its hide if they want to make this a full time job. If we could get these assignments for OS we might be in a position to justify a couple additional slots. I don't think there is anyone better qualified to handle computer security subcommittee tasks

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25X1A than [] who performs this function now. [] as head of the SSC is already assigned a community wide role in compartmentation and might be a logical candidate for chairman of that subcommittee.

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25X1A [] said that the Department of State

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rep to the old TSCC looks like a favorite son if they cannot get Marv (who is now acting chairman of the TSCC) to continue as chairman of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee of the Security Committee. So by dint of current involvement we already have two logical candidates for the subcommittee. This could give us a total of four new slots, two freebies and two we might work out of DDM&S. It would also give the OS a strong position at the USIB Committee level with all the advantages of such a forum. I think it is worth considering. I'm scheduled to meet with [] this afternoon to give him a couple ideas on how to rearrange some of the statements on mission and functions in the last draft of the DCID 1/11 to overcome Proctor's comments on this issue. Proctor says our statement of functions are more mission related and vice versa. Should anything else come up, I shall inform you.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11^{1/}

Security Committee

(Effective _____)

In support of the DCI's statutory responsibilities and of his efforts to improve the Intelligence Community's product and to achieve more efficient use of intelligence resources, the community's security policies and procedures must be effective and consistent for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods^{2/}, and must insure timeliness and economy in the handling of compartmented information. Therefore, pursuant to provisions of Subsection 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to provisions of NSCID 1 and to paragraph 2. b of NSAM 317, a new standing Committee of the USIB is hereby established.

1. Name of the Committee

The committee will be known as the Security Committee

2. Mission

The mission of the committee is to provide the means by which the Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice of United States Intelligence Board principals, can:

a. Ensure the development and review of security standards, procedures and practices for the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

^{1/} Supersedes DCID 1/11, effective 23 April 1965 and DCID 1/12 effective 23 September 1964

^{2/} The term intelligence as used in this document applies only to information covered by statute, Executive Order, or other authority consonant with the DCI's statutory responsibility for foreign intelligence and for the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

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b. Develop, review and maintain standards and procedures for the dissemination of intelligence material, for the release of such material to foreign governments, and for the review of classified intelligence proposed for use in unclassified activities;

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d. Review special security and compartmentation procedures and recommend any necessary changes to achieve optimum use of intelligence consistent with protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods;

e. Ensure the development, review and maintenance of security standards and procedures for the protection of intelligence stored in or processed by computers.

3. Functions

The functions of the committee are:

a. To advise and assist the DCI as appropriate with respect to the establishment of security policies and procedures including recommendations for legislation for the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

b. To review, formulate and recommend to the DCI personnel, physical and document security standards and practices and dissemination procedures applicable to all Government departments and agencies and their contractors as such standards, practices and procedures relate to the protection of intelligence sources and methods in consideration of the effectiveness, risks and cost factors involved.

c. To review, formulate and recommend to the DCI policies and procedures governing the release of intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations, and the review of classified intelligence proposed for release to the public through declassification or other action.

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[] and that the intelligence itself is afforded a degree of protection equal to that afforded by the United States. With respect to public release, to ensure that disclosure or declassification actions are taken pursuant to proper authority and that they are accomplished so as to minimize the risk to other intelligence sources and methods.

d. On behalf of the DCI, to call upon departments and agencies to investigate any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intelligence or of intelligence sources and methods occurring within their departments and agencies. To report the results of these investigations to the DCI, through USIB. Such reports will (1) assess the disclosure's impact on the U. S. intelligence process, and its implications for national security and foreign relations, (2) describe corrective measures taken or needed to prevent such disclosures in the future or to minimize the adverse effects of the case at hand, and (3) recommend any appropriate additional actions.

e. The functions of the Security Committee as they relate to technical surveillance countermeasures, computer security and special security compartmentation are set forth in attachments 1, 2, and 3.

4. Community Responsibilities

a. Upon request of the committee chairman, USIB departments and agencies shall furnish to the committee within established security safeguards particular information needed by the committee and pertinent to its functions. Temporary material and ad hoc personnel support will be provided to the committee as needed and as mutually agreed upon by the departments and agencies represented on the committee.

b. Each USIB principal is responsible for investigation of any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intelligence or intelligence sources and methods occurring within his department or agency. When investigation determines that the possibility of compromise cannot be discounted, and the interests of the USIB or another USIB principal are involved or affected, the results of investigation will be forwarded to the Security Committee for review and possible remedial action as determined appropriate by the committee.

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5. Composition and Organization

a. The committee will consist of a full-time chairman designated by the DCI, representatives of the chiefs of departments and agencies who are members of the USIB, and representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The chairman may invite a representative of the chief of any other department or agency having functions related to matters being considered by the committee to sit with the committee whenever matters within the purview of that department or agency are to be discussed.

b. The committee will be supported by permanent subcommittees for technical surveillance countermeasures, for special security compartmentation, and for computer security, and by other subcommittees as needed and as approved by the DCI and by ad hoc working groups as approved by the chairman. The chairman of subcommittees will be designated by the committee chairman with the concurrence of the DCI. Membership on the subcommittees and ad hoc working groups need not be limited to member agencies of the committee, but may be extended by the chairman to representatives of other departments and agencies having related functional responsibilities or support capabilities.

c. The committee will have a full-time support staff to be provided by USIB departments and agencies as arranged and approved by the DCI.

6. Rules of Procedure

a. The committee shall meet upon the call of the chairman or at the request of any of its members. Items may be placed on the agenda by the DCI or by the chairman or any member of the committee.

b. Decisions or recommendations will be formulated by the chairman after giving consideration to the views of the members. At the request of a dissenting member, the chairman will refer the decision or recommendation along with dissenting opinion or opinions to the DCI.

W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11
(Attachment 2)
Computer Security

The functions of the Security Committee include:

(1) To review, formulate and recommend to the DCI policies, standards, and procedures to protect intelligence data stored or processed by computer.

(2) To advise and assist the DCI, the Intelligence Community Staff, Committees of the United States Intelligence Board, USIB member agencies and departments, and other intelligence users with respect to all computer security issues and to resolve conflicts that may arise in connection therewith.

(3) To formulate and recommend to the DCI resource programming objectives for USIB departments and agencies in the field of computer security in consideration of current and foreseen vulnerabilities and threats and with regard for the effective and efficient use of resources; to foster and to monitor an aggressive program of computer security research and development in the Intelligence Community in order to avoid unwarranted duplication and to assure the pursuit of an effective effort at resolving technical problems associated with the protection of computer operations.

(4) To coordinate all aspects of Intelligence Community efforts in defense against hostile penetration of Community computer systems and as feasible to support other Government and national efforts aimed at improving computer security technology; to foster a coordinated program of Intelligence Community computer security training and indoctrination.

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